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RIGHTS OF THE DISSENTIENT IN A TWO-MEMBER
PARTNERSHIP: A REAPPRAISAL OF RATIONALE
ABSENT a contrary agreement in the partnership articles,' any dispute
among partners over matters within the ordinary scope of the partner-
ship business will be resolved by a majority of the partners.2 A recent
North Carolina decision, National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud,' has raised the
problem of the effect of a disagreement in a two-member partnership
on a matter within the ordinary scope of the firm's business. The de-
fendants, copartners in a general partnership, regularly purchased bread
from the plaintiff for sale in their business. The defendant Stroud
notified the plaintiff's agent that he would not be liable for any future
purchases of bread by the partnership. For approximately a month
thereafter, the plaintiff supplied bread on credit at the request of the
defendant-copartner, Freeman. The partnership was then dissolved.
Under the dissolution agreement, all of the partnership assets, with a
few exceptions, were assigned to Stroud, who agreed to discharge all
of the partnership's liabilities. With the exception of the plaintiff's
claim, Stroud ultimately paid all the partnership obligations, being
forced to draw upon his personal funds to a considerable extent. Stroud
tendered to the plaintiff one-half of the amount claimed for the bread,
and invoked his disclaimer of personal liability as a bar to the plaintiff's
recovering a greater amount.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina sustained the lower court's
decision that the plaintiff could recover the full amount from Stroud.
The court stated that buying bread was within the ordinary scope of
the business, and that disagreements over ordinary matters of partner-
ship business were to be resolved by a majority of the partners.4 Be-
cause there could be no majority in a two-member partnership dispute,
each partner having equal management rights, it was held that Stroud
1 CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 275 (2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as CRANE].
2UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § iS(h) (1916), provides in part: "Any difference
arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership may be decided by a
majority of the partners ... ." Discussion is found in BARRETT & SEAGO, PARTNER-
SHIPS: LAW AND TAXATION, ch. 5 § 7.2 (1956); CRANE, 276; MECHEM, PARTNER-
SHIP § 28Z (2d ed. 1920). For the similar English rule, see ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP
ACT §24(8) (i890); LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP 403 (iith ed. x95o).
a 249 N.C. 467, io6 S.E.zd 692 (1959).
"North Carolina has enacted the Uniform Partnership Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59
4 8(h) (1957), contains the provision cited in note 2 supra.
could not restrict Freeman's authority to buy bread for the partnership.
Consequently, both partners were liable for the debt despite Stroud's
disclaimer of personal liability.5
The problem of the effect of a dissent in a two-member partnership
has arisen only infrequently.' Moreover, the decisions dealing with
the problem have reached conflicting results. A majority of these cases
recognize as effective a disclaimer of personal liability which is known
to interested third parties.
One major point of disagreement in the decisions arises where
money, goods, or services have come to the partnership from the creditor
and have been used by the partnership. Some courts have argued that
the use of the goods is a benefit to the partnership, for which both
partners should be held accountable, presumably on a quasi-contract
theory.7 Other courts have maintained that there is logically no benefit
to the dissentient, since he may have been trying to guard against an
overstocking or overextension of the partnership.8 In instances where
the dissentient knew that the goods were being delivered to the partner-
ship despite his disclaimer, some courts have found an "implied ratifi-
cation" to bolster their contention that there was a benefit.9
Other decisions are based on the premise that each partner is an
agent of the other partners.10 A few of these cases suggest, in accord
with the instant decision, that there can be no restriction on either part-
5 Justice Rodman dissented but did not file an opinion.
o In the somewhat analogous dose corporation, where the majority also rules in
disputes, "Voting shares and membership on the directorate may be evenly divided be-
tween opposing factions, or minority interests may hold veto powers over shareholder
and director action; and deadlocks occur with alarming frequency." O'NEAL, I CLOSE
CORPORATIONS § 8.o6 (1958). A major reason, perhaps, for the comparatively few
partnership cases is the ease with which disagreeing partners may dissolve their venture.
Campbell v. Bowen, 49 Ga. 417 (1873) ; Blackstone Guana Co. v. Ball, zox N.C.
534, x6o S.E. 769 (1931) ; Johnson, Clark & Co. v. Bernheim, 76 N.C. 139 (-877) ;
First Nat'l Bank v. Larsen, 146 Wis. 653, 132 N.W. 6zo (1g1) ; Willis v. Dyson, x
Stark. x64, 171 Eng. Rep. 434 (K.B. xS6) (dictum). The court in the instant case
indicated its decision would be the same regardless of benefit.
"Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod, 1o5 Ky. 624, 49 S.W. 465 (x899); Monroe
v. Conner, x5 Me. 178 (1838). Cf., De Santis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 79 Cal. App.
zd 679, 85 P.2d 489 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938) ; Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn.
659, 202 S.W. 931 (1917).
'Cowan v. Tremble, xix Cal. App. 458, 296 Pac. 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931);
Wipperman v. Stacy, 8o Wis. 345, 50 N.W. 336 (x891).
10 "Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and
the act of every partner . . . for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business
of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership." UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP AcT § 9(1) (19z2). The English provision is similar. ENGLISH PARTNER-
SHIP AcT § 5 (i890).
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ner's authority on matters within the ordinary course of business, absent
an agreement between the parties or a majority of opinion within the
partnership. 1 One notable decision has reached a similar result by
reasoning that a partner who indicated to the seller that he would not
be liable for a proposed purchase was not attempting to disclaim lia-
bility, but was trying to remain in the background of partnership trans-
actions.12  A majority of the agency-theory decisions, however, have
reached a result contrary to the present case by holding that a com-
municated dissent truncates the implied authority of the copartner as
agent, and forces the third party to rely solely on the credit of the part-
ner dealing with him. 3 The act is then that of the partner, not that of
the partnership or the dissenting partner.
. In reaching similar results, some courts have rejected the agency
theory. One court has suggested that since one partner has the power
to dissolve the partnership by notice, thereby preventing the making
of further binding contracts, the partner should also be able to protect
himself by notice against particular contracts.' 4  An even more ques-
-tionable theory is that, since a partner has the power to incur liability
by conduct or consent, he should be able to terminate such liability by
notice of dissent or disclaimer.' 5
Writers who have dealt with even-division situations in partnerships
are by no means unified in their opinions. Story took the position that
such a division must result in a "temporary suspension of the right and
• Coggeshall v. McKenney, 114 S.C. 1, 103 S.E. 30 (2920) (dictum); Wipper-
man v. Stacy, 8o Wis. 345, 50 N.W. 336 (iS91) (dictum) ; Canadian Bank of Com-
merce v. Patricia Syndicate, 2o Ont. Weekly N. 529 (Can. 292i) (dictum).
2 Dinkelspeel v. Lewis, 5o Wyo. 38o, 65 P.2d 246 (1937). Where the disagree-
ment arises-over existing obligations, one partner has not been allowed to restrict the
-other. Noyes v. New Haven, N.L. & S.R.R., 30 Conn. 1 (x861); Burns v. Treadway
.&.Webb, 174 Ky. I23, 191 S.W. 868 (1917); Lodewick v. Cutting, 121 Misc. 348,
2o N.Y.S. 276 (1923) ; Markee v. City of Philadelphia, 270 Pa. 337, xx3 Ad. 359
(1921); Butchart v. Dresser, 4 De G.M. & G. 542, 43 Eng. Rep. 6x9 (C.A. x853).
"' De Santis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 679, 85 P.2d 489 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1938); Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Conn. 124 (x289) ; Knox v. Bufflngton & Co., So
Iowa 320 (x879); Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod, xo5 Ky. 624, 49 S.W. 465
(2899).; Bull.v. Harris, 18 Ky. 195 (1857); Yeager v. Wallace, 57 Pa. 365 (1868).,
*Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 239 Tenn. 659, 202 S.W. 931 (1917). Cf., Johnston
& Co. v.-Dutton's Adm'r, 27 Ala. 245 (x855) (dictum). Only De Santis v. Miller
Petroleum Co., supra, was decided under the Uniform Partnership Act, although Bank
of Bellbuckle v. Mason, supra, made reference to the Act. It also seems clear from the
above cases that one partner may refuse to join in the issuance of negotiable paper and
not become liable thereon. Arguably, of course, this is not within the ordinary scope
of business.
1
' St..Louis Brewing Ass'n-v. Elmer, x89 Mo. App. 197, 175 S.W. 1o2 (1915).
"
5Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178 (1838).
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authority of each [partner] to carry on or manage the partnership
business. 116 Other writers have concluded that those partners in an
even-division situation who oppose undertaking new activities should
prevail,' 7 thus favoring the partner who would maintain the status quo.
Such a rule is said to be in accord with the general principle of voting,
"that the onus lies on those who affirm a proposition, and not on those
who oppose it."'" Yet, it is not dear whether the writers who have
suggested such a rule have considered the situation where the affirma-
tive proposition, the purchase of bread in the instant case, is in fact the
continuance of the status quo.
The court in the Stroud case relied heavily on Crane's statement of
case law, that only a majority can forbid otherwise permissible partner-
ship transactions.' 9 This view of the law is supported by Mechem,20
but Crane criticizes it on the ground that it allows overcommitment of
the partnership, which could not be curtailed short of dissolution.,"
Crane's criticism was implicitly rejected by the North Carolina court in
this case.
The literature in this field leaves a basic question unposed and
unanswered: Should a dissenting partner, whether in a minority, ma-
jority, or equal position in the partnership, be forced to assume the
normal obligations of partnership liability or else resort to dissolution?22
10 STORY, PARTNERSHIP § 123 ( 7 th ed. 1881). 4ccord, 4.0 AM. JUR. Partnership
§ 116 (z942). But see, Comment, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 73 (1929)-17BURDICK, PARTNERSHIP 233 ( 3 d ed. 1917); GEORGE, PARTNERSHIP 159 (1897);
GILMORE PARTNERSHIPS 368 (i91 i); LINDLEY, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 403. SHU-
MAKER, PARTNERSHIP 177 (2d ed. igxz).
"
8 UNDERHILL, PARTNERSHIP 90 (4th ed. 193).
1" "In cases of an even division of the partners as to whether or not an act within
the scope of the business should be done, of which disagreement a third person has
knowledge, it seems that logically no restriction can be placed upon the power to act.
The partnership being a going concern, activities within the scope of the business should
not be limited, save by the expressed wilL of the majority deciding a disputed question3
half of the members are not a majority." National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 249 N.C.
467, 471, zo6 S.E.2d 69±,.695 (1959)5 CRANE, 277.
20 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 24±.
21 "In practical operation application of such a solution to projected transactions
might be inconvenient and costly. If each of two partners wishes to buy goods, or hire
employees, to an extent needed for the transaction of business, and if on disagreement
known to third persons, each is to be considered as capable of acting so as to bind the
other, the firm may be put into the position of being disastrously overstocked with
goods, services or other things. In its practicaL workings the better rule appears to be
that in case of even disagreement, known to third persons, no action new or positive can
be taken until the partners themselves reach a solution." CRANE, ±.77-78.
"This point was raised on appeal in the present case, but.was not discussed in the
opinion.. Brief for Appellee, p. z, National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 2+9 N.C..467, xo6
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The Uniform Partnership Act and cases preceding it, provide an
answer to this question in those instances in which there is not an even
division of opinion within the partnership. In the language of the
Uniform Partnership Act, "Any difference arising as to ordinary mat-
ters connected with the partnership business may be decided by a ma-
jority of the partners .... This rule seems logically predicated on
the theory that all partners should be equally liable, in the absence of
an express agreement to the contrary. The Act is silent, however, where
there is an even division of opinion within the partnership.
In this latter situation the equities are closely balanced. A partner
should be able to protect himself against the capriciousness of his co-
partner by some means short of terminating the partnership.2 4 On the
'other hand, to allow the dissentient to continue as a partner and to
disclaim liability at will, in the absence of an express agreement, is an
anomaly. Moreover, it hinders the expedition of business.
Objections25 which may be interposed to the result in the Stroud
S.E.2d 69z (r959). One writer has discussed the question to some extent: "On the
whole, it may be said that the law-merchant, as it is incorporated into the common law
of England and of this country, does not permit one to secure to himself all the advan-
tages and gains of partnership, and guard himself against all its liabilities and losses;
and that his attempt to do so would be defeated by casting upon him these liabilities."
PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP 8o ( 4 th ed. 1893).
23 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § i8(h) (1916). This rule in America goes back
at least as far as Johnston & Co. v. Dutton's Adm'r, 27 Ala. 245 (x855). England
has a similar rule. ENGLISH PARTNERSHIP Acr § 24(8) (i89o). Any deviation from
this rule is a result of confusing majority and even-division situations. Matthews v.
Dare, 2o Md. 248 (1863)5 G.H. Haulenbeck Advertising Agency v. November, 27
Misc. 836, 6o N.Y. Supp. 573 (1899).
24 It is interesting that in a surprising number of the even-division cases, the dis-
senting partner was one who participated only to a limited degree in the active man-
agement and pursuit of the business5 he usually was one who might be called the
"moneyed" partner. Campbell v. Bowen, 49 Ga. 417 (1873); St. Louis Brewing Ass'n
v. Elmer, 189 Mo. App. 197, 175 S.W. 102 (1gS); Johnson, Clark & Co. v. Bern-
heim, 76 N.C. 139 (z877) 5 Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn. 659, zoz S.W.
93T (917) 5 T.T. Word Supply Co. v. Burke, 57 S.W.2d 61o (Tex. Civ. App. 1933);
Wipperman v. Stacy, 80 Wis. 345, 50 N.W. 336 (z89x); Dinkelspeel v. Lewis, 5o Wyo.
380, 65 P.2d 246 (x937).
2 There are two objections to such a policy. First, its natural concomitant might
be early dissolution of the partnership. A study of the cases involving an even division
of opinion within a partnership, however, demonstrates that dissolution is frequently
imminent anyway. See, e.g., Johnson, Clark & Co. v. Bernheim, 76 N.C. 139 (1877);
Yeager v. Wallace, 57 Pa. 365 (1868) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Larsen, 146 Wis. 653, 2
N.W. 6zo (1911); Willis v. Dyson, i Stark. 164, 171 Eng. Rep. 434 (K.B. 1816).
The intimate business association which is the essence of partnership depends for its
substance on reciprocal trust and confidence among the partners. The advent of dis-
trust, often expressed in disagreement among the partners, may frequently lead to
dissolution regardless of the policy adopted by the courts. Moreover, it is always pos-
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case do not offset the social policy which favors a partner's assuming
full partnership obligations. It is to be hoped that courts facing the
even-division situation in the future will discard the equivocal rationale
employed in the past and frankly give effect to this desirable policy.
sible for the partners to agree to some restriction at the inception of the partnership.
The danger of dissolution, therefore, should not be overemphasized.
A second, more theoretical objection to a nonrestrictive policy arises from the agency
theory of partnership law. Might not the agency of one partner to act for the other be
considered revoked in the situation where one dissents? Of course, an agency is revocable
unless it is, in the terminology of the Restatement, "given as security" or, perhaps more
familiarly, "coupled with an interest." RESTATEMENT (Second), AGENCY §§ 138-39
(1958). See Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs, z U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823). It is
submitted, however, that, if the agency is considered revoked, it should result in a total
dissolution of the partnership. See LINDLEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 283. Cf., RE-
STATEMENT (Second), AGENCY, Introductory Note Ch. 5 (1958), to the effect that,
"I[W]henever the agent should know that the principal does not desire him to act, . . .
it is wrongful for the agent to enter upon the execution of an authority which he has
reason to know the principal does not wish him to exercise."
On the other hand, to avoid dissolution of the partnership a court might find that
the agency is "coupled with an interest." RESTATEMENT (Second), AGENCY § 138,
comment d (1958), suggests that, "An agent who has become a party to a transaction
and has incurred liabilities on behalf of the principal may, in the protection of his own
interests, subject the principal to liability although the principal has terminated the
authority which he held as agent." Arguably, partners who naturally incur liabilities
on behalf of each other could fall into a similar classification. Yet, it is not clear what
repercussions this particular facet of agency law would have on partnership dissolu-
bility, and the wisdom of introducing the hazy "interest" concept might be questioned.

